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ABSTRACT
Despite the great achievements of deep neural networks (DNNs),
the vulnerability of state-of-the-art DNNs raises security concerns
of DNNs in many application domains requiring high reliability. We
propose the fault sneaking aack on DNNs, where the adversary
aims to misclassify certain input images into any target labels by
modifying the DNN parameters. We apply ADMM (alternating di-
rection method of multipliers) for solving the optimization problem
of the fault sneaking aack with two constraints: 1) the classica-
tion of the other images should be unchanged and 2) the parameter
modications should be minimized. Specically, the rst constraint
requires us not only to inject designated faults (misclassications),
but also to hide the faults for stealthy or sneaking considerations by
maintaining model accuracy. e second constraint requires us to
minimize the parameter modications (using `0 norm to measure
the number of modications and `2 norm to measure the magnitude
of modications). Comprehensive experimental evaluation demon-
strates that the proposed framework can inject multiple sneaking
faults without losing the overall test accuracy performance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern technologies based on paern recognition, machine learn-
ing, and specically deep learning, have achieved signicant break-
throughs [1] in a variety of application domains. Deep neural net-
work (DNN) has become a fundamental element and a core enabler
in the ubiquitous articial intelligence techniques. However, de-
spite the impressive performance, many recent studies demonstrate
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that state-of-the-art DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial aacks
[2, 3]. is raises concerns of the DNN robustness in many appli-
cations with high reliability and dependability requirements such
as face recognition, autonomous driving, and malware detection
[4, 5].
Aer the exploration of adversarial aacks in image classi-
cation and objection detection from 2014, the vulnerability and
robustness of DNNs have aracted ever-increasing aentions and
eorts in the research eld known as adversarial machine learning.
Since then, a large amount of eorts have been devoted to: 1) de-
sign of adversarial aacks against machine learning tasks [6–8];
2) security evaluation methodologies to systematically estimate
the DNN robustness [9, 10]; and 3) defense mechanisms under the
aacks [11–13]. is paper falls into the rst category.
e adversarial aacks can be classied into: 1) evasion aacks
[6–8] that perturb input images at test time to fool DNN classica-
tions; 2) poisoning aacks [14, 15] that manipulate training data
sets to obtain illy-trained DNN models; and 3) fault injection aacks
[16, 17] that change classications of certain input images to the
target labels by modifying DNN parameters. e general purpose
of an adversarial aack no maer its category is to have misclassi-
cations of certain images, while maintaining high model accuracy
for the other images. is work proposes the fault sneaking aack,
a new method of the fault injection aack.
Fault injection aack perturbs the DNN parameter space. As
DNNs are usually implemented and deployed on various hardware
platforms including CPUs/GPUs and dedicated accelerators, it is
possible to perturb the DNN parameters stored in memory enabled
by the development of memory fault injection techniques such as
laser beam [18] and row hammer [19]. To be practical, we propose
the fault sneaking aack to perturb the DNN parameters with
considerations of aack implementation in the hardware.
It is a more challenging task to perturb the parameters (as fault
injection aack) than to perturb the input images (as evasion at-
tack) due to the following two reasons: 1) global eect: perturbing
one input would not inuence the classications of other unper-
turbed inputs while perturbing the parameters has a global eect
for all inputs; 2) numerous parameters: the DNNs usually have a
much greater number of parameters than the pixel number of an
input image. e fault injection aack should be stealthy in that
misclassications are only for certain images while maintaining
high model accuracy for the other images, and therefore cannot be
easily detected. And it should also be ecient in that the parameter
modications should be as small as possible, and therefore can
be implemented easily in the hardware. is work tackles these
challenges by proposing the fault sneaking aack based on ADMM
(alternating direction method of multipliers).
e theoretical contributions of this work are:
+ Stealthy injection of multiple faults: e proposed fault
sneaking aack based on ADMM enables to achieve multiple desig-
nated faults (misclassications) with the exibility to specify any
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target labels and the stealthiness to hide the faults. e fault injec-
tion aack [16] can only inject one fault.
+ A systematic application of ADMM with analytical so-
lutions: Comparing with the heuristic [16], the proposed fault
sneaking aack is an optimization based framework leveraging
ADMM with analytical solutions. Comparing with evasion aacks
[8, 20], the proposed fault sneaking aack deals with a more chal-
lenging problem with higher dimensionality, but surprisingly nds
much less expensive analytical solutions.
+Ageneral ADMM framework for both `0 and `2 normmin-
imizations: e proposed ADMM based framework for solving
the optimization problem of fault sneaking aack can adopt both
`0 norm (the number of parameter modications) and `2 norm (the
magnitude of modications) to measure the dierence between orig-
inal and modied DNN models with only minor changes. However,
[16] cannot deal with the non-dierential `0 norm.
e experimental contributions of this work are:
+ Less model accuracy loss: Under the same experimental set-
tings and misclassication requirements, the proposed fault sneak-
ing aack degrades the DNN model accuracy by only 0.8 percent
for MNIST and 1.0 percent for CIFAR, while [16] degrades the DNN
model accuracy by 3.86 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively.
+ Comprehensive analysis of DNN fault tolerance: We ex-
tensively test the capability of DNNs on tolerance of fault injection
aacks. We nd that there is an upper limit on the number S of
images with successful misclassications depending on the DNN
model itself. For the DNN models used in this work, the number S
is around 10 demonstrating the tolerance for sneaking faults as 10.
2 RELATEDWORK
e adversarial aacks are reviewed from the aspects of perturbing
the inputs and perturbing the DNN parameters.
2.1 Perturbing the Input Space
Evasion aacks generate adversarial examples to fool DNNs by
perturbing the legitimate inputs. Basically, an adversarial example
is produced by adding human-imperceptible distortions onto a
legitimate image, such that the adversarial example will be classied
by the DNN as a target (wrong) label. e norm-ball constrained
evasion aacks have been well studied, including the FGM [21] and
IFGSM [22] aacks with `∞ norm restriction, the L-BFGS [3] and
C&W [6] aacks minimizing the `2 distortion, and the JSMA [23]
and ADMM [24] aacks trying to perturb the minimum number of
pixels, namely, minimizing the `0 distortion.
Many defense works have been proposed, including defensive
distillation [25] , defensive dropout [26, 27] , and robust adversarial
training. [13] e robust adversarial training method ensures strong
defense performance with high computation requirement.
2.2 Perturbing the Parameter Space
Poisoning aacks, which train DNNs by adding poisoned images
into the training data sets, and fault injection aacks, which modify
the DNN parameters directly, are aacks that perturb the DNN
parameters. Poisoning aack [14] is computation-intensive as it
requires iterative retraining and is not the focus of our paper. Fault
injection aack [16] was rst proposed by Liu et al, which uses a
heuristic approach to prole the sink class for single bias aack
scheme, and compresses the modication by iteratively enforcing
the smallest element as zero and feasibility check for gradient de-
scent aack scheme. Dierent from [16], the fault sneaking aack
uses a systematic optimization-based approach, achieving exible
designations of target labels and portion of DNN parameters to
modify, and enabling both the `2 and `0 (non-dierential) norms in
the objective function.
2.3 Practical Fault Injection Techniques
e common techniques ipping the logic values in memory in-
clude laser beam and row hammer. Laser beam [28] can precisely
change any single bit in SRAM by carefully tuning the laser beam
such as diameter and energy level [18]. Row hammer [19] can in-
ject faults into DRAM by rapidly and repeatedly accessing a given
physical memory location to ip corresponding bits [29]. Some
works demonstrate the feasibility of using row hammer on mo-
bile platforms [30] and launching the row hammer to trigger the
processor lockdown [31]. However, ne-tuning the laser beam or
locating the bits in memory can be time consuming [30]. erefore,
it is essential to minimize the number of modied parameters by
our fault sneaking aack. Recently, [17] implements the DNN fault
injection aack [16] physically on embedded systems using laser
beam. In particular, [17] injects faults into the widely used activa-
tion functions in DNNs and demonstrates the possibility to achieve
misclassications by injecting faults into the DNN hidden layer.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
reatModel: We consider an adversary tampering with the DNN
classication results of certain input images into designated tar-
get labels by modifying the DNN model parameters. In this paper,
we assume white-box aack, i.e., the adversary has the complete
knowledge of the DNN model (including both structures and pa-
rameters) and low-level implementation details (how and where
DNN parameters are located in the memory), as the highest and
most stringent security standard to assess the robustness of DNN
systems under fault sneaking aack. Given existing fault injection
techniques can precisely ip any bit of the data in memory, we as-
sume the adversary can modify any parameter in DNN to any value
that is in the valid range of the used arithmetic format. Note that,
we do not assume the adversary knows the training and testing
data sets, which are usually not available to the system users.
e adversary has two constraints when launching the fault
sneaking aack: (i) Stealthy, in that the classication results of the
other images should be kept as unchanged as possible; (ii) Ecient,
in that the modications of DNN parameters in terms of number
of modied parameters or magnitude of parameter modications
should be as small as possible. e rst constraint is important
because even if the aack is specied for certain input images, it
is highly possible to change the classication results of the other
images when modifying the DNN parameters, thereby resulting in
obviously low DNN model accuracy and easy detection of the aack.
e second constraint minimizing the parameter modications can
reduce the inuence and diculty of implementing the aack.
Attack Model: Given R images X = {xi |i = 1, · · · ,R} with
their correct labels L = {li |i = 1, · · · ,R}, we would like to change
the classication results of the rst S (S ≤ R) images to their target
labels T = {ti |i = 1, · · · , S}, while the classications of the rest
R − S images are unchanged, by modifying parameters in the DNN
model. Note that the unchanged labels of the other R − S images
are to make the aack stealthy and hard to detect.
e original DNN model parameters are denoted as θ , and δ
represents the parameter modications. So the parameters aer the
modication are θ + δ . Note that θ has the exibility of specifying
either all the DNN parameters or only a portion of the parameters,
e.g., weight parameters of the specic layer(s). e fault sneaking
aack can be formulated as an optimization problem:
min
δ
D(δ) +G(θ + δ ,X,T ,L), (1)
where D(δ)measures the DNN parameter modications; andG(θ +
δ ,X,T ,L) represents the misclassication requirements, i.e., with
the modied DNN model parameters θ + δ , the rst S images in
set X will be classied as target labels T , while the classications
of the rest R − S images are kept unchanged. e details of the D
and G functions are to be explained in the following sections.
3.1 Measurements of Parameter Modications
D(δ) represents the measurement of the parameter modications,
which should be minimized for the aack implementation eciency.
In this paper, `0 and `2 norms are used as D(δ) as follows,
D(δ) = ‖δ ‖0 or D(δ) = ‖δ ‖2. (2)
e `0 norm of δ measures the number of nonzero elements in
δ and therefore measures the number of modied parameters by
the aack. Minimizing `0 norm can make it easier to implement
the aack in DNN systems, considering that the diculty of pa-
rameter modications in real systems relates to the number of
modied parameters [19]. e `2 norm of δ denotes the standard
Euclidean distance between the modied and original parameters,
and therefore measures the magnitude of parameter modications.
Minimizing `2 norm can lead to minimal inuence of the aack.
Minimizing the `0 norm in the objective function is much harder
than minimizing the `2 norm, because the `0 norm is non-dierential.
In this paper, the proposed ADMM framework enables both `0 and
`2 norms in the objective function with only minor dierences in
the solution methods as specied in Sec. 4.
3.2 Misclassication Requirements
In (1),G(θ +δ ,X,T ,L) denotes the misclassication requirements:
1) the rst S images X1 = {xi |i = 1, · · · , S} should be classied
as the target labels T instead of their correct labels, and 2) the
classications of the rest R − S images X2 = {xi |i = S + 1, · · · ,R}
should remain unchanged as their correct labels.
In the area of adversarial machine learning, the most eective
objective function to specify that an input x should be labeled as t
is the following д function [6]:
д(θ + δ , t) = max
(
max
j,t
(Z (θ + δ ,x)j ) − Z (θ + δ ,x)t , 0
)
(3)
where Z (θ + δ ,x)j denotes the j-th element of the logits, i.e., the
input to the somax layer. e somax layer is the last layer in
the DNN model, which takes logits as input and generates the
nal probability distribution outputs. e nal outputs from the
somax layer are not utilized in the above д function, because the
nal outputs are usually dominated by the most signicant class
in a well trained model and thus less eective during computation.
e DNN chooses the label with the largest logit, that is, j∗ =
arg max
j
Z (θ + δ ,x)j . To enforce the input x is classied as label t ,
the logit of label t , Z (θ + δ ,x)t , must be larger than all of the other
logits, max
j,t
(Z (θ + δ ,x)j ). us, д(θ + δ , t) will achieve its minimal
value if x is classied as label t .
From the above analysis, we propose the detailed form of G as:
G(θ + δ ,X,T ,L) = G1(θ + δ ,X1,T) +G2(θ + δ ,X2,L), (4)
where G1 stands for the targeted misclassications of X1 and G2
denotes keeping classications of X2 unchanged. G1 and G2 are:
G1(θ + δ ,X1,T)
=
S∑
i=1
ci ·max
(
max
j,ti
(Z (θ + δ ,xi )j ) − Z (θ + δ ,xi )ti , 0
)
, (5)
G2(θ + δ ,X2,L)
=
R∑
i=S+1
ci ·max
(
max
j,li
(Z (θ + δ ,xi )j ) − Z (θ + δ ,xi )li , 0
)
. (6)
e ci ’s represent their relative importance to the measurement of
modications D(δ). ti represents the target label for the i-th image
in the S images. G1 achieves its minimum value, when the labels of
the rst S images are changed to their target labels T . Similarly,
G2 obtains its minimum value when the classications of the rest
R − S images are kept unchanged.
4 GENERAL ADMM SOLUTION FRAMEWORK
We propose a solution framework based on ADMM to solve (1) for
the fault sneaking aack. e framework is general in that it can
deal with both `0 and `2 norms asD(δ). ADMM was rst introduced
in the mid-1970s with roots in the 1950s and becomes popular
recently for large scale statistics and machine learning problems
[32]. ADMM solves the problems in the form of a decomposition-
alternating procedure, where the global problem is split into local
subproblems rst, and then the solutions to small local subproblems
are coordinated to nd a solution to the large global problem. It has
been proved in [33] that ADMM has at least the linear convergence
rate, and it empirically converges in a few tens of iterations.
4.1 ADMM Reformulation
As ADMM requires multiple variables for reducing the objective
function in alternating directions, we introduce a new auxiliary
variable z and (1) can now be reformulated as,
min
δ,z
D(z) +G(θ + δ ,X,T ,L),
s.t. z = δ .
(7)
e augmented Lagrangian function of the above problem is:
Lρ (δ, z, u) = D(z )+G(θ +δ, X, T, L)+uT (z −δ )+ ρ2 ‖z − δ ‖
2
2 . (8)
Applying the scaled form of ADMM by dening u = ρs , we obtain
Lρ (δ, z, s ) = D(z )+G(θ +δ, X, T, L)+ ρ2 ‖z − δ + s ‖
2
2−
ρ
2 ‖s ‖
2
2 . (9)
4.2 ADMM Iterations
ADMM optimizes problem (9) in iterations. Specically, in the k-th
iteration, the following steps are performed:
zk+1 = arg min
z
Lρ (δk ,z, sk ), (10)
δk+1 = arg min
δ
Lρ (δ ,zk+1, sk ), (11)
sk+1 = sk + zk+1 − δk+1. (12)
As demonstrated above, problem (9) is split into two subproblems,
(10) and (11) through ADMM. In (10), the optimal solution zk+1
is obtained by minimizing the augmented Lagrangian function
Lρ (δk ,z, sk ) with xed δk and sk . Similarly, (11) nds the optimal
δk+1 to minimize Lρ (δ ,zk+1, sk ) with xed zk+1 and sk . In (12),
we update sk+1 with zk+1 and δk+1. We can observe that ADMM
updates the two arguments in an alternating fashion, where comes
from the term alternating direction.
In the ADMM iterations, problems (10) and (11) are detailed as:
min
z
D(z) + ρ2
z − δk + sk 2
2
, (13)
min
δ
G(θ + δ ,X,T ,L) + ρ2
zk+1 − δ + sk 2
2
. (14)
e solutions to the two problems are specied as follows.
4.3 z step
In this step, we mainly solve (13). e specic closed-form solution
depends on the D function (`0 or `2 norm).
4.3.1 Solution for `0 norm. If the D function takes the `0 norm,
(13) has the following form:
min
z
‖z‖0 +
ρ
2
z − δk + sk 2
2
. (15)
e solution can be obtained elementwise [34] as
zk+1i =
{ (
δk − sk
)
i
, if
(
δk − sk
)2
i
> 2ρ
0, otherwise
. (16)
4.3.2 Solution for `2 norm. If the D function takes the `2 norm,
(13) has the following form:
min
z
‖z‖2 +
ρ
2
z − δk + sk 2
2
. (17)
By ‘block so thresholding’ operator [34], the solution is given by
zk+1 =

(
1 − 1
ρ ‖δ k−sk ‖2
) (
δk − sk
)
if
δk − sk 
2
≥ 1ρ
0 if
δk − sk 
2
< 1ρ
.
(18)
4.4 δ step
In this step, we mainly solve (14). It can be rewrien as
min
δ
R∑
i=1
дi (θ + δ ,xi ) + ρ2
zk+1 − δ + sk 2
2
, (19)
where
дi (θ+δ ,xi ) =

ci ·max
(
max
j,ti
(
Z (θ + δ ,xi )j
)
− Z (θ + δ ,xi )ti , 0
)
,
if i ∈ [1, S] ;
ci ·max
(
max
j,li
(
Z (θ + δ ,xi )j
)
− Z (θ + δ ,xi )li , 0
)
,
if i ∈ [S + 1,R] .
(20)
e дi function takes dierent forms according to the i value. If
i ∈ [1, S], дi obtains its minimum value when the classication of
xi is changed to the target label ti . If i ∈ [S + 1,R], дi achieves its
minimum when the classication is kept as the original label li .
Motivated by the linearized ADMM [35, 36, Sec. 2.2], we replace
the function дi with its rst-order Taylor expansion plus a regular-
ization term (known as Bregman divergence), ∇дi (θ+δk ,xi , li )(δ−
Table 1: `0 norm of DNN parameter modications (i.e.,
the number of modied parameters) in dierent fully con-
nected layers for MNIST.
Total Parameters `0 normS=1,R=1 S=4,R=4 S=16,R=16
e rst FC layer 205000 14016 40649 120597
e second FC layer 40200 5390 14086 34069
e last FC layer 2010 222 682 1755
Table 2: `0 norm and attack success rate whenmodifying dif-
ferent types of parameters in the last fully connected layer
for MNIST.
S=1, R=1 S=2, R=2 S=4, R=4 S=8, R=8
`0 norm for weight params. 236 458 715 1644
Success rate for weight params. 100% 100% 100% 100%
`0 norm for bias params. 2 4 -* -*
Success rate for bias params. 100% 100% 0% 0%
* ere is no need to show the `0 norm if it can not succeed.
δk ) + 12
δ − δk 2
H
, where H is a pre-dened positive denite ma-
trix , and ‖x ‖2
H
= xTHx . (14) can then be reformulated as:
min
δ
( R∑
i=1
∇дi (θ + δk ,xi )
)
(δ − δk ) + R2
δ − δk 2
H
+
ρ
2
zk+1 − δ + sk 2
2
. (21)
Leing H = αI , the solution can be obtained through
δk+1 =
1
αR + ρ
(
ρ
(
zk+1 + sk
)
+ αRδk −
( R∑
i=1
∇дi (θ + δk ,xi )
))
.
(22)
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
We demonstrate the experimental results of the proposed fault
sneaking aack on two image classication datasets, MNIST [37]
and CIFAR-10 [38]. We train two networks for MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets, respectively, sharing the same network architecture
with four convolutional layers, two max pooling layers, two fully
connected layers and one somax layer. ey achieve 99.5% ac-
curacy on MNIST and 79.5% accuracy on CIFAR-10, respectively,
which are comparable to the state-of-the-arts. e experiments are
conducted on machines with NVIDIA GTX 1080 TI GPUs.
5.1 Layer and Type of Parameters to Modify
e DNN model used has three fully connected (FC) layers. We
modify the parameters in dierent FC layers. We show the `0
norm (i.e., the number of parameter modications) achieved by the
fault sneaking aack when we modify each FC layer in Table 1.
We observe that more parameters are needed to be modied with
increasing S and R. Besides, changing the last FC layer requires
fewer parameter modications compared with the rst or second FC
layer. e reason is that the last FC layer has more direct inuence
on the output, leading to smaller number of modications by the
fault sneaking aack. erefore, in the following experiments, we
focus on modifying only the last FC layer parameters.
Next we determine the type of parameters to modify that is more
eective to implement the fault sneaking aack. In the FC layer,
Figure 1: `0 norm of DNN parameter modications in the
last fully connected layer for MNIST.
Figure 2: `0 norm of DNN parameter modications in the
last fully connected layer for CIFAR-10.
the output depends on the weights W and the biases b, that is,
FC(x ′) =Wx ′ + b, where x ′ is the input of the layer. As we can
see, the bias parameters are more directly related to the output than
the weight parameters. We show the `0 norm and the aack success
rate if we only modify the weight parameters or the bias parameters
in the last FC layer in Table 2. As the bias parameters are more
directly related to the output, it usually needs to change fewer bias
parameters to achieve the same aack objective. However, only
changing bias parameters has very limited capability which can
only lead to the misclassication of 1 or 2 images. As observed
from Table 2, changing the classication of 4 or more images would
be beyond the capability of modifying bias parameters only. is
demonstrates the limitation of the single bias aack (SBA) scheme
in [16], which only modies the bias to misclassify only one image.
Also we nd that SBA can not be extended to solve the case of
multiple images with multiple target labels. Considering the
limitation of only modifying bias parameters, we choose to perturb
both the weight and bias parameters in the following experiments.
5.2 `0 Norm of Parameter Modications
We demonstrate the number of parameter modications, i.e., the `0
norm, by the fault sneaking aack in this section. As observed from
Fig. 1 and 2, for the same R, the `0 norm of parameter modications
keeps increasing as S increases since more parameters need to be
modied to change the classications of more images into their
target labels. We have an interesting nding that when S is in the
range of {1, 2, 4}, the `0 norm tends to be smaller as R increases
from 200 to 1000 for MNIST. e reason is that larger R means the
labels of more images (R − S) need to be kept unchanged, then the
modied model should be more similar to the original model and
therefore fewer modications are required.
Table 3: `0 and `2 norms of DNN parameter modications in
the last fully connected layer for the `0 and `2 based attacks
for MNIST.
S=1, R=10 S=5, R=10 S=5, R=20
`0 norm `2 norm `0 norm `2 norm `0 norm `2 norm
`0 aack 1026 863 1208 804 1606 498
`2 aack 1431 393 1432 344 1964 226
Table 4: Test accuracy aer DNN parameter modications
for MNIST and CIFAR.
Dataset Test Acc. S=1 S=2 S=4 S=8 S=16
MNIST
R=50 85.2% 73.1% 64.7% 37.4% 29.7%
R=100 96.9% 86.6% 81.3% 76.1% 65.2%
R=200 96.7% 96.1% 95.4% 93.2% 92.6%
R=500 98.6% 98.5% 97.8% 96.9% 95.9%
R=1000 98.7% 97.9% 98.1% 96.8% 96.9%
CIFAR
R=50 57.7% 52.9% 44.9% 26.2% 18.3%
R=100 67.5% 68.7% 55.8% 42.5% 31.5%
R=200 72.3% 67.6% 69.6% 57.2% 35.4%
R=500 78.5% 77.4% 76.2% 74.5% 73.2%
R=1000 78.5% 78.2% 77.5% 77.9% 76.4%
We also notice that this phenomenon disappears when S is larger
than 8 for MNIST or for CIFAR-10. Considering the 99.5% and 79.5%
accuracy on MNIST and CIFAR-10, we believe the disappearance is
related to the DNN model capability. When S is small on MNIST,
the DNN model is able to hide a small number of misclassications
by modifying only a few parameters of the last FC layer. However,
when S is relatively large, it is not that easy to hide so many mis-
classications and the fault sneaking aack has to perturb almost
all parameters in the last FC layer without extra ability to spare.
e reason for CIFAR-10 is similar since the capability of the model
for CIFAR-10 is limited, with only 79.5% accuracy.
5.3 Comparison of `0 and `2 based Attacks
In problem (10), the `0 or `2 norm can be minimized, leading to
the corresponding `0 or `2 based fault sneaking aacks. Table 3
compares the `0 and `2 norms of the `0 and `2 based aacks for
various congurations. As seen from Table 3, the `0 based aack
achieves smaller `0 norm than the `2 based aack with larger `2
norm, due to the reason that the `2 based aack tries to minimize
the Euclidean distance between the perturbed and original model
without considering the number of parameter modications.
5.4 Test Accuracy aer Parameter Modication
As the fault sneaking aack perturbs the DNN parameters to satisfy
specic aack requirements, it is important to measure the inu-
ence of the aack beyond the required objective. In the problem
formulation, we try to reduce the inuence of fault sneaking aack
by enforcing the rest R−S images to have unchanged classications.
In Table 4, we show the test accuracy on the whole testing datasets
for MNIST and CIFAR-10 aer perturbing the model.
e test accuracy of the original model is 99.5% for MNIST and
79.5% for CIFAR. As observed from Table 4, with xed R, the test
accuracy on the modied model decreases as S increases. is
demonstrates that as a nature outcome, changing parameters to
misclassify certain images may downgrade the overall accuracy
performance of the model. In the case of S = 16 and R = 50, the
Figure 3: Fault sneaking attack success rate of the S images
aer DNN parameter modications for MNIST and CIFAR.
test accuracy drops from 99.5% to 29.7% for MNIST and from 79.5%
to 18.3% for CIFAR. However, we observe that as R increases, the
test accuracy keeps increasing for xed S . It demonstrates that
keeping the labels of the R − S images unchanged helps to stabilize
the model and reduce the inuence of changing the labels of the
S images. In the case of S = 16, if R is increased from 50 to 1000,
the test accuracy on the 10,000 test images increases from 29.7%
to 96.9% for MNIST and from 18.3% to 76.4% for CIFAR. e fault
sneaking aack can achieve classication accuracy as high as 98.7%
and 78.5% in the case of S = 1 and R = 1000 for MNIST and CIFAR,
which only degrades the accuracy by 0.8 percent and 1.0 percent
respectively, from the original models. Note that under the same
assumption of misclassifying only one image, [16] degrades the
accuracy by 3.86 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively, for MNIST
and CIFAR in the best case. Compared with [16], the proposed
aack achieves a great improvement to reduce the inuence of
model perturbation.
5.5 Tolerance for Sneaking Faults
One objective of fault sneaking aack is to hide faults by perturbing
the DNN parameters. In the experiments, we found that in the case
of large S , not all of the S images are changed to their target labels
successfully. We dene the success rate of the S images as the
percentage of images successfully changed their labels to the target
labels within the S images. We show the success rate of the S images
with various S and R congurations in Fig. 3. We observe that the
success rate keeps almost 100% if S is smaller than 10. When S is
larger than 10, the success rate would drop as S increases. Besides,
the number of successful injected faults in S is usually around 10
for dierent conguration of S . is demonstrates a limitation of
changing the classications of certain images by modifying DNN
parameters. e DNN model has a tolerance for the sneaking faults
- 10 successful misclassications by modifying the last FC layer.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose fault sneaking aack to mislead the DNN
by modifying model parameters. e `0 and `2 norms are minimized
by the general framework with constraints to keep the classication
of other images unchanged. e experimental evaluations demon-
strate that the ADMM based framework can implement the aacks
stealthily and eciently with negligible test accuracy loss.
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